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INTRODUCTION 
A man visited a spa in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, four di+erent 
times in the summer of '##(.1 Each time, he paid to receive and perform 
sexual acts with spa employees.2 As a result of this conduct, police o,cers 
executed a search warrant of the spa, and ultimately charged a female 
employee, Sun Cha Chon, with prostitution and promoting prostitution.3 
 
1 Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, #*" A.&d +*,, +*!-*% (Pa. Super. Ct. &''#). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. Because of the degrading history of the term “prostitution,” I con(ne my use of the word 
to two scenarios: when it is used in a direct quotation, and when I am referring to the laws themselves 
that are so titled. See Victoria Taylor, Campaign Urges AP Stylebook to Replace Use of ‘Prostitute’ with 
‘Sex Worker,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. $!, &'$,, $&:&# PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/life-
style/activists-ap-replace-prostitute-sex-worker-article-$.$#+!$+% [https://perma.cc/EX,%-X%U%] 
(describing an online campaign by sex workers’ rights advocates “urg[ing] the editors of the AP 
stylebook . . . to use the term ‘sex worker’ instead of ‘prostitute’”); STELLA, LANGUAGE MATTERS: 
TALKING ABOUT SEX WORK (&'$"), https://chezstella.org/wp-content/uploads/&'&'/'"/ 
StellaInfoSheetLanguageMatters.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGB#-WDFV] (describing the word 
“prostitute” as “deep-rooted negative and legalistic”). Some contemporary scholars also take issue 
with the term “sex work” in legal and policy discourse, because of its ambiguity. See Anita Bernstein, 
Essay, Working Sex Words, &, MICH. J. GENDER & L. &&$, &"&-", (&'$+) (noting that although the 
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After paying for sex, the man was not charged with prostitution or 
solicitation: in fact, he was not charged at all. On the contrary, police paid 
him a total of -&%# for the time he spent receiving oral stimulation and 
engaging in sexual intercourse with the female employees.4 The man 
discussed the sexual encounters with police, who laughed and joked with him 
on multiple occasions about the acts.5 
Despite having paid for and received sex, the man faced no charges because 
he was acting under the government’s direction. The man was approached by 
the police earlier that summer after he visited the spa on his own accord and was 
unable to afford the cost of manual sexual stimulation. The police asked him to 
act as an informant to facilitate the arrests of the women working in the spa.6 In 
this way, a customer of the spa was able to purchase sex on numerous occasions, 
paid for entirely by the police, and receive additional financial compensation, 
without any fear of criminal prosecution. 
Luckily, Ms. Chon had a defense available to her. In July '##), she .led a 
motion to dismiss, arguing that the government’s action was so outrageous 
that it violated her constitutional due process rights.7 Her motion was based 
on a little-known defense rooted in the Due Process Clause called “outrageous 
 
term “sex worker” enjoys support in progressive circles and by international organizations like the 
WHO, UN, and Amnesty International, its ambiguity complicates discussions of legalization and 
decriminalization). Still other scholars use the phrase “transactional sex,” but this phrase is more 
commonly used to describe sex in exchange for payment within the context of a relationship. 
Compare, e.g., Frankie Herrmann, Building a Fair and Just New York: Decriminalize Transactional Sex, 
$! HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. !$, !" (&'$*) (employing the term “transactional sex” to 
describe the behavior criminalized by New York’s prostitution laws), with Kelly Kilburn, Meghna 
Ranganathan, Marie C.D. Stoner, James P. Hughes, Catherine MacPhail, Yaw Agyei, F. Xavier 
Gómez-Olivé, Kathleen Kahn & Audrey Pettifor, Transactional Sex and Incident HIV Infection in a 
Cohort of Young Women from Rural South Africa, "& AIDS $%%#, $%+' (&'$*) (di-erentiating 
transactional sex from formal sex work when “the exchange is undertaken within the context of a 
relationship (no matter how temporary or ambiguous its nature); the negotiation of the terms of the 
exchange is neither explicit nor upfront; and those who engage in the practice di-erentiate their 
practice from formal sex work”). I most frequently utilize the phrase “paid sex,” in an e-ort to limit 
ambiguity without engaging a term that is demeaning or discriminatory. In my usage, “paid sex” 
refers to any sexual act in exchange for payment within the commercial context as opposed to the 
intrarelationship context. For further discussion of the importance of language in describing 
commercial sex in di-erent disciplines, see Jill McCracken, Listening to the Language of Sex 
Workers: An Analysis of Street Sex Worker Representations and Their E-ects on Sex Workers and 
Society (June &$, &''+) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona) (on (le with the University of 
Arizona Campus Repository) and Karen McMillan, Heather Worth & Patrick Rawstorne, Usage of 
the Terms Prostitution, Sex Work, Transactional Sex, and Survival Sex: Their Utility in HIV Prevention 
Research, ,+ ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. $!$+ (&'$*). 
4 Chon, #*" A.&d at +*!-*%. 
5 Id. at +#'. 
6 Id. at +*!. 
7 Id. 
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government conduct”8 that is recognized in Pennsylvania.9 The trial court 
granted her motion to dismiss, and the State appealed.10 In '##*, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court a,rmed the dismissal, agreeing that the 
government’s actions were so shocking that they violated Ms. Chon’s 
constitutional right to due process of law.11 
The outcome of Ms. Chon’s case was not guaranteed: notably, today, the 
Outrageous Government Conduct defense is only recognized in a few 
jurisdictions.12 The Supreme Court has never invalidated a government 
action based on this defense, and even where it is available, the threshold is 
often described as extremely high to the point of being nearly 
insurmountable.13 Despite being a constitutional test, defendants face very 
di+erent outcomes depending on their jurisdiction, and some may not have 
the defense available to them at all. 
This Comment argues that courts should make the Outrageous 
Government Conduct defense available to defendants in circumstances 
similar to Ms. Chon’s. Although the defense can be and has been applied in 
numerous situations, I argue that it is both useful and easy to apply in one 
particular circumstance: cases of sexual relations between government agents 
and targets of investigations, where the government’s purpose is obtaining a 
prostitution or prostitution-related conviction. 
Part I lays out the history and background of the Outrageous Government 
Conduct defense by explaining its origins, current status in di+erent circuits 
and states, and distinction from the related defense of entrapment. Part I also 
explains the types of cases in which the defense is currently used, in both 
state and federal courts across the country. 
Part II advances an argument that the Outrageous Government Conduct 
defense should be available to targets of paid-sex sting operations when police 
engage in sexual conduct or enlist con.dential informants to engage in sexual 
conduct. The Supreme Court has never addressed a case with this fact 
 
8 Although some sources refer to the defense as “outrageous governmental conduct,” I will refer 
to it only as I do above, for the sake of consistency. 
9 Commonwealth v. Mance, %!& A.&d &##, "'" (Pa. $##!). 
10 Chon, #*" A.&d at +*%. 
11 Id. at +#$. 
12 See United States v. Santana, % F."d $, , ($st Cir. $##") (“[T]he doctrine [of Outrageous 
Government Conduct] is moribund; in practice, courts have rejected its application with almost 
monotonous regularity.”); Michael Tompkins, Public Corruption, !% AM. CRIM. L. REV. $&%#, $&*& 
(&'$#) (noting that the Outrageous Government Conduct defense, as a due process violation, is not 
recognized by most circuits). 
13 See, e.g., United States v. Therrien, *,+ F."d #, $, ($st Cir. &'$+) (“A defendant’s claim of 
outrageous government misconduct faces a demanding standard, permitting the dismissal of 
criminal charges ‘only in . . . very rare instances’ . . . .”); United States v. Garza-Juarez, ##& F.&d 
*#%, #', (#th Cir. $##") (describing the standard as “extremely high” (quoting United States v. 
Smith, #&, F.&d **#, *#+ (#th Cir. $##$))). 
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pattern, nor has any circuit court addressed paid-sex sting operations as they 
relate to this defense. I argue that police engaging in sex, or enlisting 
con.dential informants to do so, with the purpose of obtaining a prostitution 
or prostitution-related conviction “shocks the conscience,” making it a 
violation of due process. I further explain why entrapment, as it stands, is an 
inadequate defense to protect victims of these operations. I outline one 
jurisdiction’s test for Outrageous Government Conduct in the context of 
sexual relationships between police and investigative targets, and I explain 
why this test undoubtedly holds that paid-sex sting operations are a violation 
of due process. Finally, I discuss the practical implications of extending 
Outrageous Government Conduct defenses to all cases of law enforcement 
engaging in sexual relationships with targets of paid-sex stings, by arguing 
that the Supreme Court should either adopt a bright line rule that this 
conduct is outrageous or adopt a test that will ensure it will be. 
I. WHAT IS THE BACKGROUND OF THE OUTRAGEOUS  
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE? 
Throughout the twentieth century, the Supreme Court discussed 
Outrageous Government Conduct as a defense to conviction based in the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.14 However, the 
Court has not explicitly relied on this test to overturn a conviction since the 
early &*!#s, instead alluding to it only in hypotheticals.15 
The Outrageous Government Conduct defense is often con/ated with 
entrapment, but there are important distinctions.16 In particular, if the 
prosecution can show that a defendant was predisposed to commit the crime 
at issue, the dominant formulation of the entrapment defense is entirely 
 
14 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, ",& U.S. $%!, $+&-+, ($#!&) (holding that forcible stomach pumping 
by police violated the Due Process Clause and operated therefore as a bar to the defendant’s conviction 
for narcotic possession); United States v. Russell, ,$$ U.S. ,&", ,"$-"& ($#+") (alluding to a hypothetical 
situation for invoking the Outrageous Government Conduct defense under the Due Process Clause). 
15 See Russell, ,$$ U.S. at ,"$-"& (“While we may some day be presented with a situation in 
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would 
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction . . . the instant 
case is distinctly not of that breed.” (citation omitted)). 
16 See United States v. Al-Cholan, %$' F."d #,!, #,#-!' (%th Cir. &'$') (distinguishing between 
the entrapment and Outrageous Government Conduct defenses due to the defendant’s confusion 
and con.ation of them); United States v. Dyess, &#" F. Supp. &d %+!, %*" n.$" (S.D. W. Va. &''") 
(“While con.ated in their origins, the doctrines of entrapment and outrageous government conduct 
are di-erent and distinguishable.”); see also John David Buretta, Note, Recon!guring the Entrapment 
and Outrageous Government Conduct Doctrines, *, GEO. L.J. $#,!, $#%" ($##%) (“The outrageous 
government conduct doctrine is a young branch on the tangled tree of the entrapment doctrine—
ill-de(ned and oozing with ambiguity. It developed out of lower courts’ misapplication of the 
entrapment doctrine . . . .”). 
!"" University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. &(*: !$* 
unavailable, regardless of the extent of law enforcement inducement.17 The 
Outrageous Government Conduct defense, on the other hand, is not defeated 
by a showing of predisposition.18 
The availability of the Outrageous Government Conduct defense varies 
widely from circuit to circuit.19 The defense is invoked frequently in relation 
to controlled substance sting operations, both when law enforcement o,cers 
purchase drugs and arrest the seller, and when individuals are convicted for 
their involvement in drug labs run by government agents.20 The defense has 
also been invoked when government agents have engaged in sexual relations 
with investigative targets, leading both states and a few circuits to fashion 
tests determining when this conduct crosses the line into Outrageous 
Government Conduct.21 
A. What Are the Origins of the Defense? 
The Outrageous Government Conduct defense was .rst recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California.22 In &*"*, three deputy sheri+s 
entered Antonio Rochin’s home without consent.23 They forced open the door 
to Mr. Rochin’s room, where he was partially dressed and in bed with his 
wife.24 When the o,cers pointed at two capsules on the nightstand beside 
Rochin’s bed and asked whose they were, Mr. Rochin swallowed both 
capsules.25 The o,cers leapt onto Rochin and tried to force the capsules out 
of his throat, but failed, instead handcu,ng him and transporting him to the 
hospital.26 Against Mr. Rochin’s will, the o,cers directed a doctor to force a 
tube down Mr. Rochin’s throat and pump his stomach, making him vomit up 
the capsules, which were found later to contain morphine.27 Mr. Rochin was 
charged and convicted for possession of morphine.28 
 
17 & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § !.&(a) n.,. (,th ed. &'',, Dec. &'$# update). 
18 See infra note *$. 
19 See infra notes #'–#%. 
20 See, e.g., Greene v. United States, ,!, F.&d +*", +*" (#th Cir. $#+$) ((nding that the 
Outrageous Government Conduct defense barred defendant’s conviction for selling bootleg whiskey 
to an undercover agent); United States v. Twigg, !** F.&d "+", "*'-*& ("d. Cir. $#+*) (holding police 
action in setting up a methamphetamine production site then arresting defendants for their 
miniscule involvement violated the Due Process Clause). 
21 See infra Section I.C. 
22 ",& U.S. $%! ($#!&). 
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On appeal, the California appellate court found that the officers were guilty 
of “unlawfully breaking into and entering defendant’s room . . . unlawfully 
assaulting and battering defendant while in the room . . . [and] unlawfully 
assaulting, battering, torturing and falsely imprisoning the defendant at the 
alleged hospital.”29 Even so, the court affirmed Mr. Rochin’s conviction, arguing 
that they were bound by Supreme Court precedent despite a “shocking series of 
violations of constitutional rights.”30 The Supreme Court of California denied 
the petition for a hearing without opinion.31 
At the Supreme Court, Justice Frankfurter penned an opinion 
condemning the police o,cers’ actions as unconstitutional.32 He did not have, 
however, a clear constitutional sticking point—a clause that proscribed these 
state actions.33 Instead, he turned to the “least speci.c and most 
comprehensive protection of liberties, the Due Process Clause.”34 
Acknowledging that the clause is “vague,” and the de.nition of due process 
itself is “not .nal and .xed,” Frankfurter nonetheless insisted that the Court 
had a duty in this case to evaluate a conviction brought about by these police 
actions in the context of the clause’s limitations.35 And in exercising that duty, 
he held that the police action in this case violated the Constitution and the 
Due Process Clause because the law enforcement actions were “conduct that 
shocks the conscience.”36 Forcible stomach pumping to attain inculpatory 
evidence “is bound to o+end even hardened sensibilities,” because it is “too 
close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional di+erentiation.”37 
In essence, Justice Frankfurter held that police violated the Due Process 
Clause because they acted outrageously. 
Reading Rochin today, the police conduct looks initially like a Fourth 
Amendment question.38 But because it was decided before the Fourth 
 
29 Id. at $%+. 
30 Id. at $%%-%+. 
31 Id. at $%+. 
32 Id. at $%%, $%*, $+&, $+,. 
33 See Jane R. Bambauer & Toni M. Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational, $'' MINN. L. REV. &*$, 
&#' (&'$!) (describing the Rochin holding as the “tentative judicial testing a-orded by the vague 
promises of due process”). 
34 Rochin, ",& U.S. at $+'. 
35 See id. at $+'-+$ (“The Due Process Clause places upon this Court the duty of exercising a 
judgment, within the narrow con(nes of judicial power in reviewing State convictions, upon 
interests of society pushing in opposite directions.”). 
36 Id. at $+&, $+,. 
37 Id. at $+&. 
38 See Bambauer & Massaro, supra note "", at &*#-#' (“After all, today the facts of Rochin would 
easily qualify for a Fourth Amendment challenge, and the evidence used against Rochin would be 
excluded on that basis.”). 
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Amendment’s incorporation,39 the Court found that the police conduct 
violated the Due Process Clause itself.40 Frankfurter’s holding relied on his 
and other judges’ instinctive reaction to the o,cers’ actions, rather than on 
any prior legal rule or de.nition.41 
Once Mapp incorporated the Fourth Amendment, the Rochin test fell into 
disuse.42 But the Supreme Court revisited Rochin’s rhetoric around twenty 
years later.43 In United States v. Russell, the Court cited Rochin when alluding 
to a hypothetical situation where due process would preclude a conviction 
because of outrageous actions by law enforcement.44 In Russell, an undercover 
agent, posing as a representative for an organization interested in the 
distribution of methamphetamine, o+ered to provide the defendant an 
ingredient for the manufacture of the drug in exchange for a portion of the 
produced drug.45 The agent saw the laboratory where the defendant and 
others manufactured meth, and in accordance with their agreement, provided 
the extremely rare ingredient in exchange for narcotics.46 The defendant was 
ultimately arrested and convicted for manufacturing the drugs, and the jury 
rejected the entrapment defense.47 The court of appeals, however, found that 
because the agent had supplied an exceptionally scarce ingredient, without 
which the manufacture of the drug would have been impossible, the 
defendant had been entrapped.48 At the Supreme Court, the defendant 
argued that because the agent’s involvement in the drug’s manufacture was so 
 
39 See Mapp v. Ohio, "%+ U.S. %,", %!! ($#%$) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches 
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state 
court.”). This was not the only right that the Supreme Court invoked through the Due Process 
Clause prior to Bill of Rights’ incorporation. For a discussion about the enforcement of the rights 
against self-incrimination and coerced confessions through the Fourteenth Amendment prior to the 
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment, see Bambauer & Massaro, supra note "", at &#'. 
40 The Supreme Court has since recognized this explicitly, stating that today Rochin “would be 
treated under the Fourth Amendment, albeit with the same result.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
!&" U.S. *"", *,# n.# ($##*). The facts of Rochin today would likely fall under Schmerber, which 
noted that even drawing blood can be a Fourth Amendment violation without probable cause. 
Schmerber v. California, "*, U.S. +!+, +%*-+' ($#%%). However, it is worth noting that Schmerber 
cited to “that sense of justice” Rochin established. Id. at +!#-%' (internal quotation makrs omitted). 
41 See Rochin, ",& U.S. at $%# (“Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause 
inescapably imposes upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the 
proceedings . . . in order to ascertain whether they o-end those canons of decency and fairness 
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples . . . .”). 
42 See Bambauer & Massaro, supra note "", at &*# (describing how “[t]he Rochin test has taken 
a beating” since its creation). 
43 United States v. Russell, ,$$ U.S. ,&", ,"$-"& ($#+"). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at ,&!. 
46 Id. at ,&!-&%. 
47 Id. at ,&". For a de(nition of the standard entrapment defense and further discussion of the 
defense’s distinction from the Outrageous Government Conduct defense, see infra Section I.B. 
48 Russell, ,$$ U.S. at ,&+. 
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pivotal, a conviction on the basis of the drug production should be deemed a 
violation of due process, thus making entrapment a constitutional claim based 
only on the egregious nature of the law enforcement conduct.49 
The Court said that the defendant misunderstood entrapment, the purpose 
of which is not to enable the court to sanction or restrain “overzealous law 
enforcement,” but rather to acquit defendants who only violated the law because 
they were induced to do so.50 Although the Court held that entrapment is not a 
constitutional defense, it did not preclude the possibility of a constitutionally 
rooted defense based on overzealous law enforcement conduct. In addressing 
this hypothetical future, the Court cited to Rochin, noting, “[w]hile we may some 
day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement 
agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the 
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, the instant 
case is distinctly not of that breed.”51 
Soon after, the Court was presented with another claim of Outrageous 
Government Conduct. In Hampton v. United States, an informant for the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) arranged a heroin sale between DEA 
agents and the defendant.52 The defendant gave undercover agents a total of 
around -(!# worth of heroin, on two separate occasions, and was arrested.53 The 
defendant argued that the informant had given him the narcotics, and that at 
the time, he believed it to be counterfeit heroin.54 He said that he was entrapped 
by the informant and agents, who misled him into unknowingly selling heroin 
and ultimately arrested and charged him with the crime.55 He was found guilty, 
his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.56 At the Court, he argued that his conviction was a violation 
of the Due Process Clause based on the language in Russell.57 
In Hampton, the Court .rmly rejected the constitutional claim.58 While 
admitting that the government played a larger role in Mr. Hampton’s 
conviction than in Mr. Russell’s, the Court held that there was no due process 
violation because the Government did not violate any protected right of the 
 
49 Id. at ,"'. 
50 Id. at ,"!. 
51 Id. at ,"$-"&. 
52 ,&! U.S. ,*,, ,*% ($#+%). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at ,*%-*+. 
55 See id. at ,*+-** (indicating that Mr. Hampton asserted he was “the victim of entrapment” 
in a proposed jury instruction). 
56 Id. at ,*,, ,*#. 
57 Id. at ,*#. 
58 See id. (“In urging that this case involves a violation of his due process rights, petitioner 
misapprehends the meaning of the quoted language in Russell.”). 
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defendant.59 Justice Rehnquist asserted that “[t]he remedy of the criminal 
defendant with respect to the acts of Government agents, which, far from 
being resisted, are encouraged by him, lies solely in the defense of 
entrapment.”60 However, Justice Rehnquist made this assertion representing 
only three Justices—a plurality, but not a majority.61 Five Justices, 
representing both a concurrence and the dissent, found that there could be an 
Outrageous Government Conduct defense founded in the Due Process 
Clause, even in circumstances where entrapment did not exist.62 Therefore, a 
majority of Justices in Hampton recognized the availability of an Outrageous 
Government Conduct defense as conceived in Rochin and Russell. 
B. How Is the Defense Distinct from Entrapment? 
The entrapment defense developed as a common-law doctrine through 
state courts early in the twentieth century, eventually making its way into 
federal courts.63 Entrapment was o,cially recognized by the Supreme Court 
in &*$', in the landmark case Sorrells v. United States.64 The defendant in 
Sorrells was charged with and convicted of possessing and selling alcohol 
during prohibition.65 The defendant did sell a half gallon of whiskey to a 
government agent, but he did so only after the agent asked on three separate 
occasions, and the .rst two times the defendant refused.66 The trial court 
refused to submit the issue of entrapment to the jury, holding that 
entrapment failed as a matter of law.67 The Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court’s judgment, holding that the issue of entrapment should have been 
 
59 Id. at ,*#-#$. 
60 Id. at ,#'. This conclusion seems rather at odds with Justice Rehnquist’s own dicta in Russell. 
See Russell, ,$$ U.S. at ,"& (“[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct 
of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the 
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction . . . .”). This contradiction has 
been described by a lower court judge as Justice Rehnquist “trying to put back in the bottle the genie 
he had loosed.” United States v. Dyke, +$* F."d $&*&, $&*! ($'th Cir. &'$"). 
61 Hampton, ,&! U.S. at ,*,. 
62 See id. at ,#! (Powell, J., concurring) (“I therefore am unwilling to join the plurality in 
concluding that, no matter what the circumstances, neither due process principles nor our 
supervisory power could support a bar to conviction in any case where the Government is able to 
prove predisposition.”); id. at ,## (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Powell that 
entrapment “is only one possible defense . . . in cases where the Government’s conduct is as 
egregious as in this case,” and noting due process as an alternate defense). 
63 For a thorough canvas of entrapment’s development as a legal concept in American courts, 
see John D. Lombardo, Comment, Causation and “Objective” Entrapment: Toward a Culpability-
Centered Approach, ," UCLA L. REV. &'#, &$%-", ($##!). 
64 &*+ U.S. ,"!, ,!& ($#"&). 
65 Id. at ,"*. 
66 Id. at ,"#. 
67 Id. at ,"*. 
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submitted for the jury to decide.68 Anticipating likely criticism for usurping 
legislative power by deriving an entirely new criminal defense, the Court 
insisted that its decision was a matter of statutory interpretation—a duty to 
avoid “[l]iteral interpretation[s] of statutes at the expense of the reason of the 
law and producing absurd consequences or /agrant injustice.”69 The Court 
found that reading the statute literally to allow police inducement would 
violate “the highest public policy in the maintenance of the integrity of 
administration,” which the legislature could not possibly have intended.70 
The Court in Sorrells set the stage not only for entrapment as a federally 
recognized defense but also for continuing controversy over the relevance of 
a defendant’s “predisposition” to commit the crime. The majority opinion by 
Justice Hughes asserted that a defendant’s predisposition is necessarily 
relevant to any claim of entrapment, saying that a defendant who “seeks 
acquittal by reason of entrapment . . . cannot complain of an appropriate and 
searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon 
that issue.”71 If the inquiry into a defendant’s predisposition harms him, said 
Justice Hughes, “he has brought it upon himself.”72 
In a famous concurrence, Justice Roberts agreed with the necessity for an 
entrapment defense but pushed back against lack-of-predisposition as an 
element. When a crime is committed because of inducement by a government 
agent, Justice Roberts argued, the defendant’s prior bad acts should not come in 
at all, because “[w]hatever may be the demerits of the defendant or his previous 
infractions of law these will not justify the instigation and creation of a new 
crime, as a means to reach him and punish him for his past misdemeanors.”73 
The arguments set forth on either side of Sorrells are now expressed as the 
two distinct views of entrapment: the approach of the majority, often called 
the “subjective approach” or the Sherman–Sorrells doctrine,74 and the approach 
of the concurrence, known as the “objective approach” or the Roberts–
Frankfurter approach.75 
 
68 Id. at ,!&. 
69 Id. at ,,%; see also Jessica A. Roth, The Anomaly of Entrapment, #$ WASH. U. L. REV. #+#, ##"-
#, (&'$,) (noting that, by relying on canons of statutory interpretation, the Court avoided the “dilemma” 
of overstepping its bounds into executive or legislative arenas to develop the defense of entrapment). 
70 Sorrells, &*+ U.S. at ,,*-,#. 
71 Id. at ,!$. 
72 Id. at ,!&. 
73 Id. at ,!*-!#. 
74 This name reflects that a number of years later, another famous Supreme Court case embodied 
the same division of opinion on entrapment as Sorrells. In Sherman v. United States, Justice Warren held 
that when a defense of entrapment is asserted, a defendant “will be subjected to an appropriate and 
searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing on his claim of innocence.” Sherman 
v. United States, "!% U.S. "%#, "+" ($#!*) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75 LAFAVE, supra note $+, § !.&(b). The “Roberts-Frankfurter approach” designation refers to the 
famous concurring opinions of Justice Roberts in Sorrells and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman. See id. § !.&(b) 
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Federal courts and approximately two-thirds of the states take the subjective 
approach.76 To prevail under the subjective approach, a defendant must show 
first that the crime was the product of government inducement, and second, that 
the defendant was not predisposed to commit this type of offense.77 
The Model Penal Code,78 as well as about one third of the states,79 have 
adopted the objective approach. The objective approach removes the bar of 
defendant predisposition. Instead, it provides for a defense of entrapment 
any time a crime was induced by government agents “employing methods of 
persuasion or inducement that create a substantial risk that such an o+ense 
will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.”80 
Under this formulation, even a predisposed defendant can bring an 
entrapment defense. 
The Outrageous Government Conduct defense is similar to the objective 
approach to entrapment because it is not barred by predisposition.81 Even the 
name of the defense—Outrageous Government Conduct—underscores a 
singular focus on the conduct of government agents instead of on the target 
of the investigation. But the Outrageous Government Conduct defense does 
have distinctions from the objective approach to entrapment—most notably, 
in the basis and timing of the defense. 
The Outrageous Government Conduct defense is rooted in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.82 Whether 
government conduct is outrageous to the point of violating the Fifth 
Amendment is a question of law that must be raised and ruled on in a pretrial 
motion, or else it is waived under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
 
(“There is growing support for the objective approach, variously described as the ‘hypothetical person’ 
approach or the Roberts-Frankfurter approach.”). Both Justices took the position that “[n]o matter what 
the defendant’s past record and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in 
the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by 
an advanced society.” Sherman, "!% U.S. at "*&-*". 
76 LAFAVE, supra note $+, § !.&(a). 
77 Id. 
78 MODEL PENAL CODE § &.$" (AM. L. INST. $#*!). 
79 LAFAVE, supra note $+, § !.&(b) n."'. 
80 MODEL PENAL CODE § &.$"(b) (AM. L. INST. $#*!). 
81 See United States v. Mosley, #%! F.&d. #'%, #'# ($'th Cir. $##&) (“The defense of outrageous 
conduct is distinct from the defense of entrapment in that the entrapment defense looks to the state 
of mind of the defendant to determine whether he was predisposed to commit the crime. . . . The 
outrageous conduct defense, in contrast, looks at the government’s behavior.”). 
82 U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV; see also Richard Lawrence Daniels, Note, United 
States v. Simpson: “Outrageousness!” What Does It Really Mean?—An Examination of the Outrageous 
Conduct Defense, $* SW. U. L. REV. $'!, $'! ($#**) (“The ‘outrageous conduct’ defense is based on 
the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”). 
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&'(b)(&)-(') and analogous rules of state criminal procedure.83 Entrapment, 
on the other hand, whether subjective or objective, is typically a question of 
fact that is considered by the jury.84 
Entrapment is not based in the Due Process Clause, nor any part of the 
Constitution. As a criminal defense it is unique, because unlike other 
standard criminal defenses it is also not based in history or English common 
law.85 Rather, the entrapment defense is a product of the twentieth-century 
United States: during prohibition, widespread concern about government 
agents inducing violations by setting up alcohol operations led to the creation 
of the common-law entrapment defense.86 Now all states have an entrapment 
defense, primarily through common law.87 
Because the entrapment defense is not constitutionally based, states have 
the freedom to de.ne it more /exibly, which is part of why there are multiple 
distinct formulations of entrapment. The Supreme Court does not have the 
power to dictate the test for entrapment, or to overrule state formulations. 
C. What Is the State of the Defense Today? 
Although the Supreme Court attempted to clarify its entrapment and 
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in Hampton, the confusing outcome left 
little guidance for lower courts when adjudicating police inducement and the 
Supreme Court has not addressed it since.88 As a result, the Outrageous 
Government Conduct defense primarily plays out in lower courts, and to 
vastly di+erent outcomes.89 
 
83 See, e.g., United States v. Henderson-Durand, #*! F.&d #+', #+" & n.! (*th Cir. $##"); 
United States v. Duncan, *#% F.&d &+$, &+, (+th Cir. $##'); United States v. Nunez-Rios, %&& F.&d 
$'#", $'## (&d Cir. $#*'). 
84 Zelinger, infra note $#$, at $%'. 
85 See Paul Marcus, Interview, The Entrapment Defense, "' OHIO N.U. L. REV. &$$, &$% (&'',) 
(“[T]raditional defenses, such as self-defense, defense of others, necessity, and the insanity defense—that 
sort of claim in our system comes from the early English common law. . . . That is not true with the 
entrapment defense.”). 
86 See id.; Lisa McGirr, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE 
AMERICAN STATE &'% (&'$%) (“The years of constitutional Prohibition . . . introduced some of the 
salient aspects of modern criminal law and procedure,” including entrapment). 
87 Marcus, supra note *!, at &$%. 
88 See Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Preserving the Outrageous Government Conduct 
Defense, #$ NW. U. L. REV. "'!, "$! ($##$) (“The Supreme Court, seeing the confusion wrought by 
[Russell], sought to clarify the defense in Hampton v. United States. Yet, the Court’s fractured opinion 
only further muddied the waters in the course of con(rming the viability of the defense.”). 
89 Id. at "$# (explaining how the Supreme Court avoided explaining Outrageous Government 
Conduct, thereby “leaving lower courts to develop the contours of the defense.”). 
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&. In Federal Court? 
Both the availability and the formulation of the Outrageous Government 
Conduct defense vary widely from circuit to circuit. On one end of the 
spectrum are the circuits that have declared the doctrine dead, entirely 
blocking defendants who cannot invoke entrapment from making inducement 
arguments.90 Next on the spectrum are circuits that recognize the doctrine, 
but maintain an extremely high threshold to trigger it.91 Finally, there are 
circuits who maintain the doctrine is “not entirely mummi.ed,”92 but have so 
far declined to extend it, calling themselves in one case “the never say never 
camp—or at least the don’t-say-never-if-you-don’t-have-to camp.” 93 On the 
whole, among the circuit courts, the doctrine is recognized as “often raised 
but seldom saluted.”94 In spite of the uphill path to success, most of the 
circuits have at the very least recognized the defense as viable.95 
Although it is a high burden to prove, the defense has nonetheless been 
successful in numerous federal cases, most frequently in drug sales and drug 
manufacturing cases. Often the defense is invoked in so-called “reverse-sting 
 
90 Included in circuits that refuse to recognize the defense are the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. See, 
e.g., United States v. Tucker, &* F."d $,&', $,&%-&+ (%th Cir. $##,) (refusing to recognize a due process 
defense for outrageous police misconduct); United States v. Boyd, !! F."d &"#, &,$ (+th Cir. $##!) 
(explicitly rejecting Outrageous Government Conduct as a defense); United States v. Smith, +#& F."d 
+%' (+th Cir. &'$!) (“We repeatedly have reaffirmed our decision not to recognize the defense.”). 
91 See, e.g., United States v. LeRoux, +"* F.&d #,", #,* (*th Cir. $#*,) (holding that an 
undercover agent’s substantial participation in an illegal enterprise did not violate the Constitution 
because it was not “so outrageous and shocking that it exceeded the bounds of fundamental 
fairness”); United States v. Stinson, %,+ F."d $$#%, $&'# (#th Cir. &'$$) (requiring a defendant to 
show that police action was “so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense 
of justice” to show a due process violation, and noting the defense is “limited to extreme cases”); 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, $!! F."d &&$, &"' ("rd Cir. $##*) (recognizing the defense while 
conceding that its’ viability is “hanging by a thread”); United States v. Osborne, #"! F.&d "&, "% (,th 
Cir. $##$) (a)rming that the Outrageous Government Conduct defense requires an extremely “high 
shock threshold,” and canvasing disturbing cases where “[t]he court’s conscience remained 
undisturbed”); United States v. Rodriguez, %'" F. App’x "'%, "$& (!th Cir. &'$!) (“It is well-
established in this circuit that a due process violation will be found only in the rarest and most 
outrageous circumstances.” (quoting United States v. Tobias, %%& F.&d "*$, "*% (!th Cir. $#*$)). 
92 United States v. Santana, % F."d $, $& ($st Cir. $##"). 
93 United States v. Dyke, +$* F."d $&*&, $&*+ ($'th Cir. &'$"). For additional circuits that tentatively 
recognize the defense but avoid applying it, see Santana, % F."d at , (“The historical record makes it 
clear, therefore, that the outrageous misconduct defense is almost never successful.”); United States v. 
Ciszkowski, ,#& F."d $&%,, $&+& ($$th Cir. &''+) (Carnes, C.J., concurring) (noting that while the $$th 
Circuit recognizes the defense of Outrageous Government Conduct, it is rooted “in . . . speculative 
dicta,” and “[t]his Court has not ever reversed a conviction or vacated a sentence” on its basis). 
94 Santana, % F."d at ,. 
95 Only two Circuits—the Sixth and Seventh—have explicitly refused to recognize the 
defense. See Tucker, &* F."d at $,&%-&+; Boyd, !! F."d at &,$; see also United States v. Mosley, #%! 
F.&d #'%, #'# ($'th Cir. $##&) (“Notwithstanding the lack of a clear holding on outrageous conduct 
by the Supreme Court, most of the circuits, including this one, have recognized the viability of the 
outrageous conduct defense.”). 
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operations,” when law enforcement officers sell drugs to an investigative target 
and arrest the purchasers.96 For example, the Ninth Circuit found a violation of 
due process when a special investigator posed as a member of a gang selling 
bootleg whiskey; it called the government’s actions “wholly impermissible 
participation” and reversed the convictions of both defendants.97 
Another formulation of the defense occurs in cases where individuals are 
convicted for their involvement in drug laboratories that were set up and run 
by undercover government agents. In one such case, United States v. Twigg, 
the defendant, Neville, was approached by a con.dential informant acting on 
DEA agent orders about setting up a laboratory to produce 
methamphetamine.98 They planned to divide the work, with the informant 
assuming all responsibility for acquiring equipment, ingredients, and a 
location for the laboratory.99 The informant did obtain glassware, chemicals, 
and a location, receiving substantial .nancial and logistical assistance from 
the DEA.100 At this point, the second defendant, Twigg, who owed a debt to 
Neville, was introduced to the informant.101 The laboratory ran for one week, 
which resulted in about six pounds of methamphetamine being produced.102 
During that time, the laboratory was run completely by the con.dential 
informant; Neville and Twigg completed only speci.c and small tasks as 
directed by the informant, which included running errands and buying co+ee 
or groceries.103 Both defendants were arrested after Neville was stopped 
leaving with the drugs on his person.104 
 
96 “Reverse-sting” typically describes a set-up where law enforcement o)cers pose as drug 
sellers, distinguishable from so-called “buy and busts,” in which o)cers pose as drug buyers. See 
Gail M. Greaney, Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line: Due Process and the Law Enforcement 
Justi!cation, %+ NOTRE DAME L. REV. +,!, +!+ ($##&). The term has also been used when o)cers 
set up a fake “stash-house” or another location to be targets of robbery, and then arrest those who 
attempt to rob them. See, e.g., Shayna Jacobs, "# Years. "$% Arrests. No White Defendants. DEA Tactics 
Face Scrutiny in New York, WASH. POST (Dec. $,, &'$#, *:'! PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national-security/$'-years-$+#-arrests-no-white-defendants-dea-tactics-face-scrutiny-in-new-
york/&'$#/$&/$,/f%,%&&,&-$&ce-$$ea-bf%&-eadd!d$$f!!#_story.html [https://perma.cc/W!QC-HJPE] 
(using “reverse sting” to describe federal agents waiting to intercept seven defendants for 
attempting to rob “what they believed was a Harlem stash house holding around /*'',''' worth 
of heroin and cocaine”). 
97 Greene v. United States, ,!, F.&d +*", +*,-*! (#th Cir. $#+$). But see United States v. Haas, 
No. #%-$'!"', #%-$'!!", $##* WL **!!', at *$ (#th Cir. $##*) (expressing hesitation to follow Greene 
in other cases, noting in an unpublished opinion that Greene “may be an entrapment rather than an 
outrageous government conduct case”). 
98 !** F.&d "+", "+! ("d Cir. $#+*). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at "+!-+%. 
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The Third Circuit noted that entrapment was not an issue on appeal for 
either defendant because Twigg was not brought into the criminal enterprise 
by a government agent and because Neville was predisposed.105 Presented 
with two cases of government inducement, neither of which allowed for a 
defense of entrapment, the court held that the police conduct was outrageous 
to the point of violating the Due Process Clause.106 The court pointed to the 
government’s involvement in supplying the necessary ingredients and the 
location, at cost only to the government, and to the informant’s role as 
supervisor in the laboratory.107 In spite of Neville’s predisposition, the court 
held that upholding the conviction was disallowed by principles of 
fundamental fairness.108 The Outrageous Government Conduct defense was 
granted for both defendants, and both convictions were reversed.109 
A final category in which the defense is often presented, and of the greatest 
importance to this comment, is when sexual relations occur between 
government agents or confidential informants and investigative targets. These 
cases typically address situations where undercover agents or informants have 
sexual relationships with targets but not to secure a sex-based conviction: for 
example, to develop trust, or as a result of a past relationship.110 In response to 
cases along these lines, a few circuit courts have developed tests to “identify the 
point at which physical contact and emotional intimacy between an undercover 
agent and his or her target suspect becomes outrageous . . . .”111 
In the Second Circuit, one case involving sexual relationships between 
government agents and targets inspired the court to develop a test for this 
speci.c circumstance. In United States v. Cuervelo, the defendant Gomez-
Galvis was charged as a coconspirator in the importation of cocaine from 
Panama into the United States.112 Gomez-Galvis alleged that an undercover 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at "*'-*$. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at "*$. 
109 Id. at "*$-*&. 
110 See, e.g., United States v. Nolan-Cooper, $!! F."d &&$, &", ("d Cir. $##*) (holding that the 
Outrageous Government Conduct defense is not implicated by “a one-time sexual encounter 
[between an agent and a target] that served no investigatory purpose occurring near the end of an 
investigation . . . .”); United States v. Miller, *#$ F.&d $&%!, $&%%, $&%* (+th Cir. $#*#) ((nding no 
due process violation when an undercover agent had previously been sexually intimate with the 
target of a drug investigation); United States v. Fadel, *,, F.&d $,&!, $,&# ($'th Cir. $#**) (referring 
to the lower court decision that an agent instigating a sexual relationship while investigating a target 
did not constitute Outrageous Government Conduct). For an argument why the Outrageous 
Government Conduct defense should apply when undercover o)cers induce criminal activity or 
assistance in an investigation through sex and romance, see Andrea B. Daloia, Note, Sexual 
Misconduct and the Government: Time to Take a Stand, ,* CLEV. ST. L. REV. +#" (&'''). 
111 Nolan-Cooper, $!! F."d at &"&. 
112 #,# F.&d !!#, !%" (&d. Cir. $##$). 
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DEA agent seduced her, wrote her love letters, and ultimately had sex with 
her approximately .fteen times.113 Based on their romantic and sexual 
relationship, Gomez-Galvis agreed to help the agent .nd a drug supplier in 
Colombia.114 Ultimately, Gomez-Galvis arranged a meeting for the agent 
with a drug dealer in Colombia, whom she had never before helped to sell 
drugs.115 She explained that she acted only as a go-between, passing messages 
between the two men, but argued that the government’s actions violated due 
process purely because of her romantic and sexual relationship with the 
undercover agent.116 Gomez-Galvis described this conduct as “sexual 
entrapment,” and argued that the government’s actions were a violation of 
due process because “[l]egitimate undercover operations can be conducted 
without federal agents acting like modern day Mata Haris.”117 
In Cuervelo, rather than determining whether or not the government’s 
conduct was outrageous, the court established a three-part test that set forth the 
minimum for unconstitutional conduct and remanded the case to the lower court 
for additional fact finding on whether the standard was met.118 Under Cuervelo, 
to succeed on a due process claim pertaining to a sexual relationship between 
the defendant and a government agent, the defendant must show 
(!) that the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its 
investigatory arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes 
upon learning that such a relationship existed; 
(") that the government agent initiated a sexual relationship, or allowed it to 
continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends; and 
(#) that the sexual relationship took place during or close to the period 
covered by the indictment and was entwined with the events charged 
therein.119 
The same test was adapted by the Third Circuit in United States v. Nolan-
Cooper, with a variation: part one requires only that the defendant show that 
 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at !%,. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. Mata Hari was a suspected German spy in World War I who was accused of sharing 
information with the military o)cers she seduced. Rachel Siegel, ‘I Am Ready’: Mata Hari Faced a 
Firing Squad for Spying—and Refused a Blindfold., WASH. POST (Oct. $!, &'$+, ":'' AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/&'$+/$'/$!/i-am-ready-mata-hari-faced-a-
(ring-squad-for-spying-and-refused-a-blindfold [https://perma.cc/LY!R-KVA%]. Recent accounts 
have suggested she may have been entirely innocent of spying and was selling sex because she was 
living in poverty after leaving an abusive relationship. Id. 
118 Cuervelo, #,# F.&d at !%+. 
119 Id. 
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“the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory 
arsenal or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes once it knew or 
should have known that such a relationship existed.”120 
'. In State Court? 
Defendants have raised the Outrageous Government Conduct defense in 
state courts with similar results as in federal courts.121 Notably, unlike in 
federal court, state courts have speci.cally discussed due process as a defense 
in paid-sex sting operations many times over the past .fty years. In the &*)#s 
and &*%#s, a number of state courts analyzed the constitutionality of paid-sex 
sting operations involving sexual contact, but overwhelmingly found no due 
process violation.122 
More recently, however, state courts faced with the same issue have found 
that sexual misconduct between undercover agents and investigative targets 
does cross a constitutional line. In State v. Burkland, a case eerily similar to 
Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, an undercover o,cer in Minneapolis posed 
as a customer at a tanning salon suspected of selling sex.123 The o,cer 
bargained for, paid for, and engaged in sexual contact with an employee, who 
was then found guilty of prostitution based on the interaction.124 The court 
held that 
when a police o$cer’s conduct in a Prostitution investigation involves the 
initiation of sexual contact that is not required for the collection of evidence 
to establish the elements of the o%ense, this conduct, initiated by the 
investigating o$cer, is su$ciently outrageous to violate the “concept of 
fundamental fairness inherent” in the guarantee of due process.125 
 
120 $!! F."d &&$, &"" ("d Cir. $##*). 
121 See, e.g., State v. Williams, %&" So.&d ,%&, ,%,-%% (Fla. $##") ((nding law enforcement 
conduct a violation of due process when a chemist for a local Sheri- ’s o)ce manufactured crack 
cocaine using powdered cocaine that had been seized to sell in a reverse-sting operation that resulted 
in defendant’s being arrested and prosecuted). 
122 See, e.g., State v. Tookes, %## P.&d #*", #*+ (Haw. $#*!) (“While we question whether the 
actions of . . . the police in this case comport with the ethical standards which law enforcement 
o)cials should be guided by, we cannot say that they constituted outrageous conduct in the 
constitutional sense.”); State v. Emerson, !$+ P.&d &,!, &,# (Wash. Ct. App. $#+") (“Although our 
opinion should not be misconstrued as a moral endorsement of the means employed to obtain the 
evidence . . . we cannot say the trial court erred in using the police agent’s evidence in convicting 
the defendant.” ); Anchorage v. Flanagan, %,# P.&d #!+, #%" (Alaska Ct. App. $#*&) (“Although [the 
o)cer’s] conduct . . . might be considered questionable, we do not think that this conduct—even in 
the context of an investigation involving a relatively minor misdemeanor charge—can accurately be 
characterized as outrageous.”). 
123 State v. Burkland, ++! N.W.&d "+&, "+" (Minn. Ct. App. &''#). 
124 Id. at "+,. 
125 Id. at "+%. 
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The Minnesota appellate court found that the o,cer violated due process 
by initiating sexual contact and allowing the contact to escalate, because the 
escalation was “unnecessary to any reasonable investigation and offensive 
to due process.”126 
In summary, the Outrageous Government Conduct defense is recognized 
by a number of jurisdictions, both state and federal, but succeeds relatively 
rarely. I argue that, in line with the Minnesota appellate court’s opinion in 
Burkland, any sexual contact in paid-sex sting operations, performed either by 
undercover police o,cers or con.dential informants, should be su,cient for 
a defendant to prevail on the defense. 
II. PAID-SEX STING OPERATIONS THAT USE SEXUAL CONTACT  
BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS  
CONSTITUTE OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT  
THAT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS 
The Supreme Court should hold that sting operations where law 
enforcement o,cers or informants engage in sexual activity to enable 
prostitution arrests constitute Outrageous Government Conduct and 
therefore are violations of due process. Because of the intimate nature of 
sexual conduct, the uniquely vulnerable population targeted by paid-sex sting 
operations, and the government’s comparatively minor interest in enacting 
these operations, these kinds of paid-sex sting operations clearly “shock the 
conscience” and violate the Due Process Clause. 
The Court need not reinvent the wheel to hold sexual activity in paid 
sting operations violates due process: in fact, the Cuervelo and Nolan-Cooper 
tests that govern this question in the Second and Third Circuits clearly show 
that sexual activity for paid-sex sting operations is Outrageous Government 
Conduct.127 Therefore, the Supreme Court need only adopt these lower-court 
tests to ensure no convictions stem from police or informant sexual relations 
with investigative targets in prostitution crimes. Alternatively, the Supreme 
Court can issue a bright-line rule that it violates the Due Process Clause for 
a government agent or informant to engage in sexual contact for the purposes 
of securing a prostitution or solicitation conviction. 
A. Sexual Contact During Paid-Sex Sting Operations “Shocks the Conscience” 
Due process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantees those 
rights that are fundamental, implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and 
 
126 Id. 
127 The Cuervelo and Nolan-Cooper tests are set forth in Section II.C, infra. 
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deeply rooted in our history and tradition.128 Rochin and its progeny held that 
law enforcement conduct to obtain convictions may violate due process on its 
own, when the law enforcement action in question “shocks the conscience” or 
exceeds the bounds of fundamental fairness.129 
Law enforcement engaging in undercover paid sex or encouraging 
informants to do so in order to secure a prostitution or prostitution-related 
conviction exceeds the bounds of fundamental fairness because of the 
degrading nature of the intrusion, the limited ends of securing conviction, 
and because the police action is unnecessary to further those limited ends. It 
shocks the conscience because it targets vulnerable populations for the 
pleasure of police o,cers, and because the sexual contact subverts any 
reasonable basis for seeking paid-sex convictions in the .rst place. 
&. Deceptive Sex Is a Unique Intrusion on Privacy, Bodily Integrity, and 
Autonomy Over Intimate Relationships 
Twentieth-century Supreme Court jurisprudence makes it abundantly 
clear that sex is a uniquely personal and intimate function, and governmental 
regulation of it must be scrutinized extremely carefully.130 In the case of paid-
sex sting operations, the government is not only regulating but directly 
engaging in sexual contact in order to charge individuals with the crime of 
prostitution.131 This should be scrutinized particularly closely because law 
enforcement is intruding on privacy to obtain evidence to be used in a 
criminal conviction, which amounts to the greatest possible restriction on 
liberty.132 
 
128 Washington v. Glucksberg, !&$ U.S. +'&, +&'-&$ ($##+). 
129 Rochin v. California, ",& U.S. $%!, $+& ($#!&). 
130 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, !"# U.S. !!*, !+$-+& (&''") (noting that our country’s “laws and 
traditions in the past half century . . . . show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial 
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to 
sex”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, !'! U.S. *"", *!$ ($##&) (noting that the decisions 
relating to procreation are “the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, ,'! U.S. ,"#, ,!" ($#+&) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it 
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally a-ecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, "*$ U.S ,+#, ,*! ($#%!) (holding that regulation of contraceptives violated 
the Constitution by intruding on the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms”). 
131 For an argument that sexual contact with sex workers for the purpose of securing 
prostitution convictions violates sex workers’ due process right to bodily integrity, see Paula Del 
Valle Torres, Comment, Sexual Contact Between A Suspect and Police O&cers: How Far Should Police 
Go to Prove Prostitution?, &* AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. ,+$, ,*,-*+ (&'&'). 
132 See Mesarosh v. United States, "!& U.S. $, $, ($#!%) (noting the Court’s duty is “to see that 
the waters of justice are not polluted,” because when they are, “[t]he government of a strong and 
free nation does not need [such] convictions”). 
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Unlike a typical substantive due process claim, paid sex is currently illegal. 
The government may consequently claim that the intrusion is justi.ed by law 
enforcement need to ferret out illegal conduct, just like in the case of 
con.dential informants buying drugs. But intrusions of privacy for the sake 
of law enforcement must be scrutinized as carefully as those for other reasons. 
In the words of Justice Brandeis, 
it is also immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when 
the government’s purposes are bene&cent. Men born to freedom are naturally 
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest 
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding.133 
Sting operations that involve government operatives engaging in crime in 
order to prevent and punish crime are suspect from the outset. Even more 
ubiquitous sting operations, like buy and bust drug operations, have been 
criticized for causing serious third-party harms.134 Such operations may be 
undertaken to bene.t police departments and government agencies by 
increasing conviction numbers even when they do not bene.t public safety.135 
And it can be di,cult to distinguish between sting operations that “reveal the 
criminal design” by ferreting out individuals that theoretically would have 
committed the crime in question with or without the sting, and those that 
target individuals who would not do so but for the operation.136 Courts 
emphasize that the purpose of sting operations must be the former: “The 
function of the enforcement o,cials is to investigate, not instigate, crime; to 
discover, not to promote, crime.”137 But in reality, distinguishing between the 
two kinds of conduct can be impossible, and sting operations may both target 
and charge individuals who would not have committed the crime otherwise.138 
 
133 Olmstead v. United States, &++ U.S. ,"*, ,+# ($#&*). 
134 See e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, Sting Victims: Third-Party Harms in Undercover 
Police Operations, ** S. CAL. L. REV. $"'#, $"$$ (&'$!) (“Law enforcement agencies can structure 
undercover operations to control for potential harms, but not all harms can be prevented. Innocent 
third parties may be inadvertently victimized. For example, a street “buy and bust” gone wrong 
might lead to an exchange of gun(re and an injured innocent bystander.”). 
135 Id. at $""+-"*. 
136 See Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, +' MO. L. REV. "*+, 
,'&-$$ (&''!) (deriving a mathematical approach to determining how likely the target of a sting 
operation would have been to commit the crime in question without law enforcement inducement). 
137 Patty v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, !'* P.&d $$&$, $$&%-&+ (Cal. $#+"). 
138 See, e.g., '(): Valentine’s Day: *" Chump Street, THIS AM. LIFE, at &!:!& (Feb. *, &'$"), 
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/,*%/valentines-day/act-two-! [https://perma.cc/MU!F-L&H!] 
(telling the story of a boy charged with a felony after procuring marijuana for a girl he had a crush 
on, who turned out to be an undercover police o)cer posing as a student). 
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What’s more, the dangerous power dynamics when law enforcement 
intervenes in criminal enterprises can have far-reaching consequences.139 
Even accepting the premise that sting operations should be permissible in a 
classic drug “buy and bust” scenario, purchasing and engaging in sex is 
fundamentally distinct from buying drugs, most importantly because of the 
intent of the agent. An agent who receives drugs, unlike a civilian who receives 
drugs, has no intention to use those drugs for any personal benefit through use 
or sale. There would certainly be a problem with a police officer who engaged in 
a drug bust and then sold the drugs or pocketed them for his own use.140 
Although possession of a controlled substance is technically a crime,141 and 
an o,cer or con.dential informant does possess that substance, it seems 
intuitive that the purpose of laws prohibiting possession is based ultimately 
in the use or distribution of controlled substances. An agent or con.dential 
informant who receives drugs theoretically turns them into the police 
department immediately. Once again, if they did not do so, they would most 
certainly be subject to criminal prosecution. A paid-sex sting operation is 
signi.cantly di+erent, because by engaging in sex, agents are committing the 
very crime the statute prohibits for their own gain. 
'. The Government Has Limited Interest in Using Paid-Sex Sting 
Operations to Enable Prostitution Prosecutions 
When analyzing Outrageous Government Conduct, particularly in regard 
to sting operations, courts should consider the limited government interest 
in preventing the crime in question. Although government interest is not an 
explicit factor in the Supreme Court majority’s test for Outrageous 
Government Conduct, Outrageous Government Conduct is a constitutional 
 
139 See Joh & Joo, supra note $",. Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigations has a 
history of planting undercover agents to take down organized crime rings, and the results have often 
looked more like the FBI promoting mob operations than curtailing them. See Patrick Radden Keefe, 
Assets and Liabilities: The Mobster Whitey Bulger Secretly Worked for the F.B.I. Or Was it the Other Way 
Around?, NEW YORKER (Sept. $,, &'$!), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/&'$!/'#/&$/assets-
and-liabilities/amp [https://perma.cc/J,YC-HDK+] (“[The FBI] disclosed that in the prior year it 
had authorized informants to break the law on !,#"# occasions.”). 
140 Not that it doesn’t happen. See, e.g., Jeremy Roebuck, Former Philly O&cer Sentenced to % 
Years for Selling Drugs Stolen by Corrupt Baltimore Police Squad, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. &#, &'$#), 
https://www.inquirer.com/news/eric-snell-philly-police-corruption-gun-trace-task-force-baltimore-
&'$#',&#.html [https://perma.cc/!#DV-+P#%] (“A former Philadelphia police o)cer was sentenced 
to nine years in prison Friday for conspiring with o)cers in Baltimore to sell cocaine and heroin 
seized from that city’s streets.”). But police o)cers and undercover agents who break the law are 
hypothetically held to the same standard as ordinary citizens. Contra Heien v. North Carolina, !+, 
U.S. !,, %+ (&'$,) (holding that, although an ordinary citizen cannot avoid criminal liability because 
they misunderstand the law, police o)cers can justify investigatory stops based on 
misunderstandings of the law). 
141 See, e.g., &$ U.S.C. § *,,. 
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protection, and constitutional protections (particularly the most nebulous 
ones) frequently involve analyzing the importance of the government 
interest, even when the court is not explicit that it is doing so.142 Justice 
Powell, in his Hampton concurrence, hinted that government interest is 
important in a due process determination, by arguing that the serious danger 
of drug rings warranted more latitude for police undercover operations into 
them.143 Additionally, circuit courts have stated that the nature of the crime 
and therefore necessity of the sting operation are important factors in an 
Outrageous Government Conduct analysis.144 
An analysis of the government interests at play clari.es a number of 
important factors that weigh against paid-sex sting operations where o,cers 
engage in sexual contact with the target. First, engaging in sexual intercourse 
during sting operations is utterly unnecessary to secure a conviction.145 
Second, allowing for sexual contact in paid-sex sting operations creates 
dangerous incentives in a culture where police sexual violence is already a 
tremendous problem.146 And .nally, paid-sex sting operations do nothing to 
advance protection for the vulnerable victims whose protection is touted as 
the reason for criminalizing paid sex in the .rst place.147 
a. Engaging in Sexual Contact Is Unnecessary to Secure a Prostitution Conviction 
Courts have considered “the need for the investigative technique that was 
used in light of the challenges of investigating and prosecuting the type of 
crime being investigated.”148 Sexual contact occurring in paid-sex sting 
operations is not needed to limit paid sex. 
First, engaging in sexual contact or encouraging engagement in sexual 
conduct is absolutely unnecessary to secure a prostitution conviction. The 
laws are built for prostitution arrests absent sexual conduct, because typically 
 
142 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Signi!cant Interests, ,! HASTINGS L.J. 
*&!, *&% ($##") (“[I]nterests (nd their way into virtually every theory of constitutional law. The 
failure to identify their presence only serves to protect their power.”). 
143 Hampton v. United States, ,&! U.S. ,*,, ,#! n.+ ($#+%) (Powell, J., concurring) (“One 
cannot easily exaggerate the problems confronted by law enforcement authorities in dealing 
e-ectively with an expanding narcotics tra)c . . . which is one of the major contributing causes of 
escalating crime in our cities. . . . Enforcement o)cials therefore must be allowed .exibility 
adequate to counter e-ectively such criminal activity.”). 
144 See, e.g., United States v. Black, +"" F."d &#,, "'" (#th Cir. &'$") (listing factors in 
Outrageous Government Conduct analysis, including “the nature of the crime being pursued and 
necessity for the actions taken in light of the nature of the criminal enterprise at issue”); United 
States v. Twigg, !** F.&d "+", "+* n.% ("d Cir. $#+*) (“[T]he court must consider the nature of the 
crime and the tools available to law enforcement agencies to combat it.”). 
145 See infra sub-subsection II.A.&.a. 
146 See infra sub-subsection II.A.&.b. 
147 See infra sub-subsection II.A.&.c. 
148 Black, +"" F."d at "'#. 
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prostitution and its parallel o+ense, solicitation, allow o,cers to charge 
individuals either when they are engaging in paid sexual intercourse or 
o+ering to do so.149 There is no argument for committing an undisputed 
crime at the expense of an investigation’s target when the same conviction can 
be secured without it. “If the police are going to arrest a suspected prostitute, 
go ahead and make the arrest—but do not sport with her.”150 
Second, if the law enforcement goal is strictly reduction of the sale of sex, 
the police can instead engage in no-contact sting operations targeting men 
who are buying sex instead of people who are selling it. Studies have shown 
that arresting so-called “Johns” instead of sex workers was signi.cantly more 
e+ective in reducing sex sales.151 This approach is less likely to target low-
income women of color, and trans and gender-nonconforming people of color, 
which paid-sex sting operations and policing in general does.152 
b. Agents or Informants Who Engage in Sexual Contact for Purposes of Paid-Sex 
Stings Have Inappropriate and Dangerous Incentives 
Paid-sex sting operations enable a power dynamic conducive to law 
enforcement abuse. In Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, the informant intended 
 
149 See, e.g., +&' ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. !/$$-$, (West &'$&) (de(ning Prostitution in Illinois 
law as “knowingly perform[ing], o-er[ing] or agree[ing] to perform any act of sexual penetration”); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. $+-A, § *!$($) (West &'$#) (“‘Prostitution’ means engaging in, or agreeing 
to engage in, or o-ering to engage in a sexual act or sexual contact.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § &"'.'' 
(Consol. &'&') (“A person is guilty of Prostitution when such person engages or agrees or o-ers to 
engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § $,-&'"(!) 
(&'$#) (de(ning prostitution under North Carolina law as “[t]he performance of, o-er of, or 
agreement to perform” sexual acts for payment); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §,".'&(a) (West &'$#) 
(describing prostitution as “knowingly o-er[ing] or agree[ing to receive a fee from another to engage 
in sexual conduct”); WASH. REV. CODE § #A.**.'"' (&'&') (de(ning prostitution as “engag[ing] 
or agree[ing] or o-er[ing] to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee”). 
When the statute is not explicit that agreement to perform prostitution is su)cient for conviction, 
state courts most often have found it to be so. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Potts, ,%' A.&d $$&+, $$"! 
(Pa. Super. Ct. $#*") (holding that even though the Pennsylvania statute de(ning Prostitution is 
not explicit, Prostitution clearly “encompasses an agreement to perform” sexual acts for hire). For 
further discussion of the variation among state Prostitution laws, see Prostitution and Sex Workers, * 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. "!!, "!%-%' (&''+). 
150 State v. Thoreson, No. A'%–,!,, &''+ WL $'!"&'!, at *$$ (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. $', &''+). 
151 See MICHAEL SHIVELY, KRISTINA KLIORYS, KRISTIN WHEELER & DANA HUNT, A 
NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF PROSTITUTION AND SEX TRAFFICKING DEMAND REDUCTION 
EFFORTS, FINAL REPORT, at iv (&'$&), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pd)les$/nij/grants/&"*+#%.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N!*P-AUN&] (“When compared to evidence of the e-ectiveness of interventions 
addressing supply and distribution in curtailing commercial sex markets, evidence supporting the 
impact of demand-reduction initiatives is relatively strong.”). 
152 ERIN FITZGERALD, SARAH ELSPETH, DARBY HICKEY WITH CHERNO BIKO & HARPER 
JEAN TOBIN, MEANINGFUL WORK: TRANSGENDER EXPERIENCES IN THE SEX TRADE ! (&'$!), 
https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/Meaningful%&'Work-Full%&'Report_FINAL_".pdf  
[https://perma.cc/UBR&-QR&B]. 
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to pay for sex even prior to agreeing to participate in the sting operation.153 And 
even if officers or confidential informants do not set out to pay for sex, when 
they do anyway, they are fundamentally benefiting from sexual pleasure in the 
interaction. In cases like Chon, undercover agents benefit twice: they engage in 
sexual activity, and they receive payment. But even without overt payment, 
police and agents who stand to gain at the expense of investigation targets should 
be included in Outrageous Government Conduct when it is fundamentally 
unnecessary for the investigation, because it creates dangerous incentives. 
In addition to the sexual benefit, the power dynamic between officers and 
investigative targets in a sexual transaction is inappropriate and dangerous. It is 
all too easy to imagine the abuses of power that could (and do) occur: officers 
have the incentive to selectively target women they want to have sexual 
intercourse with and to extort or force sex.154 State-sanctioned sexual activity 
between police and those who are targets of their investigation—particularly 
those who are women, people of color, and LGBTQ0—is a recipe for state-
sanctioned egregious misconduct.155 It is also worth noting that when officers 
engage in undercover sting operations intended to target “Johns” rather than sex 
workers, incidents involving sexual contact are “extremely rare,”156 suggesting 
that sexual contact is more related to officer preference than necessity.157 
 
153 Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, #*" A.&d +*,, +*! (Pa. Super. Ct. &''#). 
154 See Sirin Kale, Police Are Allegedly Sleeping with Sex Workers Before Arresting Them, VICE 
(May ", &'$+, *:"' AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/!#mbkx/police-are-allegely-sleeping-with-
sex-workers-before-arresting-them [https://perma.cc/X"*X-NH+K] (“Former LAPD o)cer and sex 
worker activist Norma Jean Almodovar says that many undercover vice cops engaging in prostitution 
busts have less than honorable intentions. ‘It’s a game to them . . . . They get to screw us for free, 
and cops love freebies. Think how much they love donuts.’”). 
155 See RACHEL SWANER, MELISSA LABRIOLA, MICHAEL REMPEL, ALLYSON WALKER & 
JOSEPH SPADAFORE, YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN THE SEX TRADE: A NATIONAL STUDY %$ (&'$%), 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/(les/documents/Youth%&'Involvement%&'in%&'the
%&'Sex%&'Trade_".pdf [https://perma.cc/""BD-VVYK] ((nding that in &''#, around *'% of 
nationwide arrestees for prostitution were women, and !!% of arrests of under-$*-year-olds, and ,"% 
of arrests between $* and &,-year-olds, were black); id. at xi (“Trans females ("+%) were signi(cantly 
more likely than cis males ($&%) or cis females ($+%) to report a prior prostitution arrest and at least 
three times more likely to report a prostitution arrest in the past year ("'% v. #% v. $'%).”); David 
E. Kanouse, Sandra H. Berry & Naihua Duan, Drawing a Probability Sample of Female Street Prostitutes 
in Los Angeles County, "+ J. SEX RSCH. ,!, ,# ($###) ((nding only $+% of sex worker respondents in 
a probability sample of female sex workers were white). 
156 GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA $+ ($#**). 
157 See Phillip Walters, Would a Cop Do This: Ending the Practice of Sexual Sampling in Prostitution 
Stings, &# LAW & INEQ. ,!$, ,+& (&'$$) (arguing that “the discrepancy in how stings involving female 
undercover o)cers and same-sex encounters are handled” may be attributable to the homophobic 
hypermasculine police culture and to the fact that “o)cers do not want to engage in sexual activity 
with suspected johns”). 
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These scenarios are not hypothetical: even outside of paid-sex sting 
operations, law enforcement sexual assault is already far too common.158 
When the Department of Justice investigated the Baltimore Police 
Department, one report found that sexual misconduct was the second most 
common form of reported police misconduct.159 In '#&(, the Department of 
Justice reported that multiple Baltimore o,cers targeted people involved in 
the sex trade “to coerce sexual favors . . . in exchange for avoiding arrest, or 
for cash or narcotics.”160 O,cers in numerous other states have also been 
convicted of extorting sex from women in exchange for dropping charges, 
often speci.cally targeting women of color and sex workers.161 In addition, 
o,cers who are charged with sexual violence have disturbingly high rates of 
recidivism.162 The well-documented “cult of masculinity” in policing that 
encourages and enables law enforcement sexual violence suggests that this 
behavior will continue.163 And even apart from police culture or individual 
o,cer motivations, police work is inherently rife with opportunities for 
police sexual violence: from the vulnerability of the citizens they engage with, 
 
158 See id. (quoting an expert who explained that “[t]he reality of some police having sex with 
sex workers during the course of undercover operations has been in existence as long as selling sex 
has been a criminal o-ense”). 
159 THE CATO INST., NATIONAL POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT: &'$' 
ANNUAL REPORT $ (&'$'), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/++th&'$"/Exhibits/Assembly/JUD/ 
AJUD""*L.pdf [https://perma.cc/U!!B-TS%R]. 
160 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
$,# (&'$%), https://www.justice.gov/crt/(le/**"&#%/download [https://perma.cc/#%PP-#*SA]. 
161 See, e.g., Sean Murphy, Ex-Oklahoma O&cer Gets *)+ Years for Rapes, Sex Assaults, ASSOC. 
PRESS (Jan. &$, &'$%), https://apnews.com/f,e'%$'c&f%',c&c#!efd*d!f&,,e'*e/ex-oklahoma-o)cer-
be-sentenced-rape-sex-crimes [https://perma.cc/F!+!-*MTC] (telling the story of a police o)cer 
who raped and sexually victimized Black women who he suspected of being addicted to drugs or 
working in the sex trade); Matt Hamilton, Two LAPD O&cers Plead No Contest to Sexually Assaulting 
Women While on Duty, Receive *,-Year Prison Terms, L.A. TIMES (Feb. &%, &'$*, ,:!! PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-o)cers-rape-plea-&'$*'&&%-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/FUJ,-P"S"] (describing how two LAPD o)cers pled no contest to allegations of 
extorting sex from women arrested or serving as informants related to drug crime); Kelly Mena, 
Ex-Cops Once Accused of Rape Sentenced to , Years Probation, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (Oct. $', 
&'$#), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/&'$#/$'/$'/ex-cops-once-accused-of-rape-sentenced-to-!-
years-probation [https://perma.cc/TUS*-RLFR] (describing how two Brooklyn police officers 
were sentenced to five years’ probation after they had sex with a $#-year-old in custody for 
marijuana possession). 
162 See Cara E. Rabe-Hemp & Jeremy Braithwaite, An Exploration of Recidivism and the O&cer 
Shu-e in Police Sexual Violence, $% POLICE Q. $&+ (&'$&) ((nding that ,$% of police sexual violence 
cases were committed by o)cers who had prior accusations of sexual violence, and that those 
recidivist o)cers had on average four victims each). 
163 See Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, To Serve and Pursue: Exploring Police Sexual 
Violence Against Women, $& JUST. Q. *!, #$ ($##!) (discussing research into sexism in police culture 
and comparing law enforcement to other male-dominated organizations); Walters, supra note $!+ 
(“[T]he tendency for sexual conduct to occur in prostitution stings involving interactions between 
male o)cers and women engaged in prostitution may be better understood as an issue of power and 
gender rather than one of law enforcement necessity.”). 
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to the coercive power of an o,cer’s ability to arrest and charge, to the lack of 
immediate on-the-job oversight.164 Giving o,cers the power to engage in 
sexual contact in paid-sex sting operations only serves as state-sanctioned 
police sexual violence, and creates an environment where it is even more 
di,cult for victims of law enforcement rape and sexual misconduct to seek a 
remedy. The government’s interest should be in eliminating law enforcement 
sexual violence, rather than creating situations in which it can thrive. 
c. Paid-Sex Sting Operations are Unsupported by Predominant Arguments for 
Criminalization of Paid Sex 
Paid-sex sting operations do not further the goals that supposedly justi.ed 
criminalizing paid sex in the .rst place. When laws criminalizing paid sex 
were initially passed over a century ago, they were based in religious views of 
“morality”165 and utilized morality-centric language. Over time the language 
of social morality was removed,166 but instead pro-criminalization arguments 
today focus entirely on the need to protect vulnerable women in the sex 
trade.167 Rather than attacking sex sellers, the movement against 
 
164 Philip M. Stinson Sr., John Liederbach, Steven L. Brewer Jr. & Brooke E. Mathna, Police Sexual 
Misconduct: A National Scale Study of Arrested Officers, &% CRIM. JUST. POL. REV. %%!, %%!-%% (&'$!). 
165 See Prostitution and Sex Workers, * GEO. J. GENDER & L. "!!, "!!-!% (noting that morality 
concerns among religious groups and women’s societies in the late nineteenth century contributed 
to some states regulating and eventually banning prostitution). 
166 For example, the stated purpose of the $#$' White Slave Tra)c Act, more commonly known 
as the Mann Act, was to combat forced prostitution, but it was utilized (and upheld by the Supreme 
Court) to prosecute all measures of immoral sexual behavior, even consensual sex. See Eric Weiner, 
The Long, Colorful History of the Mann Act, NPR (Mar. $$, &''*, &:'' PM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId0**$',"'* [https://perma.cc/UCM*-
W*&F]; Caminetti v. United States, &,& U.S. ,+', ,*!-*% ($#$+) (stating that the Mann Act prohibits 
the transportation of women through interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in immoral 
practices and implying that consensual sex quali(es as such a practice); Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral 
Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, $$! YALE L.J. +!%, +#" (&''%) (explaining how Caminetti 
found that the language of the Mann Act “clearly included this broader swath of immoral sexual 
behavior”). The Act resulted from widespread “moral panic” around the imaginary crisis of white 
slavery, which was based on “sensationalized stories of innocent girls kidnapped o- the streets by 
foreigners, drugged, smuggled across the country and forced to work in brothels.” Weiner, supra. 
Initially the Mann Act was explicit in its moral underpinnings, making it illegal to transport women 
interstate “for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.” "% Stat. 
*!, *&! ($#$') (codi(ed at $* U.S.C. § &,&$). In $#*%, Congress amended the Mann Act to eliminate 
the language of “debauchery” and “immoral purpose,” so that instead the law forbade interstate 
transport with intent to engage in “prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can 
be charged with a criminal o-ense.” Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of $#*%, Pub. L. No. 
##-%&*, § !(b), $'' Stat. "!$$ ($#*%). 
167 See, e.g., Janice G. Raymond, Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution and a Legal Response 
to the Demand for Prostitution, & J. TRAUMA PRAC. "$!, "$% (&''*) (giving ten reasons why legalization 
“makes the harm of prostitution to women invisible, expands the sex industry, and does not empower 
the women in prostitution”); Timothy Williams, In Washington, a Fight to Decriminalize Prostitution 
Divides Allies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. $*, &'$#), https://www.nytimes.com/&'$#/$'/$+/us/washington-
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decriminalization points to incidents of sex tra,cking and violence,168 and 
equivocates paid sex with rape or sexual assault because of the power dynamic 
between seller and purchaser.169 This language comes from politicians, 
authors, activists, and opponents to decriminalization on both the political 
left and the right.170 
With this rationale for maintaining laws criminalizing paid sex, both 
advocates and opponents of decriminalization should condemn paid-sex sting 
operations that involve sexual contact. For law enforcement to engage in sex 
in order to secure criminal convictions in/icts the very social ill that advocates 
for criminalization claim to oppose. The debate around prostitution laws is 
 
legal-prostitution.html [https://perma.cc/L*CN-M#R*] (reporting that opponents of D.C.’s bill to 
decriminalize sex work argued that the bill “will cause more harm and more exploitation of our most 
marginalized people”); Marissa J. Lang, D.C. E.ort to Decriminalize Sex Work Won’t Move Forward 
After "'-Hour Hearing, WASH. POST (Nov. $+, &'$#, !:,' PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/dc-politics/dc-e-ort-to-decriminalize-sex-work-wont-move-forward-after-tense-$,-hour-
hearing/&'$#/$$/$%/b+c++"!*-'%ef-$$ea-ac$&-""&!d,#eacaa_story.html [https://perma.cc/%*TK-
VUSD] (quoting one opponent of D.C.’s bill saying “[t]o separate prostitution from human 
tra)cking is impossible . . . . If you pass this law . . . you will all have blood on your hands”). 
168 See, e.g., Letter from Magdy Abdel-Hamid, Egyptian Association for Community Participation 
Enhancement, et al. to Salil Shetty, Sec. Gen., Amnesty Int’l & Seven W. Hawkins, Exec. Dir., Amnesty 
Int’l, Statement on Amnesty International’s Resolution to Decriminalize Pimps, Brothel Owners and 
Buyers of Sex (July $$, &'$!), https://catwinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/&'$#/'#/AI-Open-
Letter-over-%''-sigs.pdf [https://perma.cc/%NT!-S%ZD] (arguing that the decriminalization of sex 
work increases sex tra)cking and violence against women). 
169 See generally Evelina Giobbe, Prostitution: Buying the Right to Rape, in RAPE AND SEXUAL 
ASSAULT III $,", $,, ($##$) (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., $##$) (arguing that regardless of a sex 
worker’s degree of control, paid sex is sexual abuse). 
170 Progressive and feminist thinkers like Andrea Dworkin and Catharine McKinnon oppose 
paid sex as the ultimate tool of oppression of women. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and 
Civil Rights, $ MICH. J. GENDER & L. $", $" ($##") (“Women are prostituted precisely in order to be 
degraded and subjected to cruel and brutal treatment without human limits . . . .”); Andrea 
Dworkin, Pornography and the New Puritans, N.Y. TIMES (May ", $##&), https://archive.nytimes.com/ 
www.nytimes.com/books/#+/'%/$!/lifetimes/&!**!.html [https://perma.cc/ZU%F-WT#Z] (using 
the imagery of a “woman lynched naked on a tree, or restrained with ropes and a ball gag in her 
mouth” to describe Dworkin’s view of the con(nes of prostitution). Since the early $#''s Republican 
lawmakers have relied on narratives of vulnerable women forced into sex slavery to pass legislation 
that ultimately served only to arrest and charge those women themselves. See Hallie Lieberman, 
Why Laws to Fight Sex Tra&cking Often Back!re, WASH. POST (Mar. ,, &'$#, %:'' AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/&'$#/'"/',/why-laws-(ght-sex-tra)cking-often-back(re 
[https://perma.cc/,ZTE-S!*P] (noting that the Mann Act was passed in $#$' to “protect women 
from being forced into prostitution,” but in the (rst four years +$% of the convictions it brought 
were of sex workers). A modern law, the Fight Online Sex Tra)cking Act (FOSTA) of &'$+, has 
been analogized to the Mann Act because advocates on both sides of the political aisle argued that 
it would protect vulnerable women; once passed, it has been criticized for “directly endanger[ing] 
individuals who perform commercial sexual services.” Lura Chamberlain, FOSTA: A Hostile Law 
With a Human Cost, *+ FORDHAM L. REV. &$+$, &&'"-', (&'$#); see also Lieberman, supra, at " 
(arguing that “FOSTA’s development has been eerily similar to the Mann Act’s” because both are 
based in racism and carry a tremendous cost to the purported victims they claim to protect). 
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intensely divisive and does not fall along traditional party lines.171 But given 
the widespread agreement on both sides that policy and legislation 
surrounding paid sex should focus on supporting and protecting those on the 
selling side, no advocate of decriminalization or criminalization should 
support the police tactics at issue in this piece.172 
$. State Court Decisions Denying Defendants’ Outrageous Government 
Conduct Claims in Transactional Sex Sting Operations Must be 
Reexamined in Light of Changing Societal Circumstances 
The “shocks the conscience” test—and substantive due process as a 
concept—depends on the collective conscience and the normative views of 
society at the time. Therefore, what shocks the conscience “is bound to fall 
di+erently at di+erent times” as it evolves.173 Consequently, change in societal 
views may necessitate revisiting the application of the Due Process Clause. 
Opponents of an Outrageous Government Conduct defense in paid-sex 
sting operations have plenty of state court decisions to bolster their 
arguments.174 Most of these decisions are at least thirty years old, however, and 
are noticeably antiquated in their arguments and holdings. For example, State v. 
Emerson is a case out of Washington State in which the court held that a paid-
sex sting operation involving sexual intercourse did not violate the Due Process 
Clause.175 The defendant in Emerson was convicted under a law that forbade 
acting as a “common prostitute.”176 The law defined “common prostitute” as “a 
woman who offered her body for indiscriminate sexual intercourse with more 
than one man,” regardless of whether she received payment.177 To determine 
whether a woman was a “common prostitute” by law, juries were to “consider [a 
woman’s] general conduct and all other circumstances . . . tending to show 
 
171 See generally Lara Gerassi, A Heated Debate: Theoretical Perspectives of Sexual Exploitation and 
Sex Work, ,& J. SOC. & SOCIO. WELFARE +# (&'$!) (reviewing the multitude of philosophical, legal, 
and political perspectives prostitution laws are analyzed with); Jody Freeman, The Feminist Debate 
Over Prostitution Reform: Prostitutes’ Rights Groups, Radical Feminists, and the (Im)possibility of Consent, 
! BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. +!, +! ($#*#) (describing the varying theoretical and ideological bases 
that cause divergent views of prostitution). 
172 Although this argument assumes that criminalization advocates make victimization 
arguments in good faith, it does not require it. Insidious motivations such as racism, homophobia, 
and transphobia certainly underlie a great deal of the sex work debate, but this animus cannot justify 
a government interest in maintaining paid-sex sting operations, implicitly or explicitly. 
173 See Rochin v. California, ",& U.S. $%!, $+'-+$ ($#!&) (“To believe that this judicial exercise 
of judgment could be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some (xed stage of time or thought 
is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate 
machines and not for judges . . . .”). 
174 See supra note $&&. 
175 Id. 
176 State v. Emerson, !$+ P.&d &,!, &,! (Wash. Ct. App. $#+").  
177 State v. Zuanich, !#" P.&d $"$,, $"&$ (Wash. $#+#) (Stafford, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
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whether or not she so holds herself out to the public.”178 The court in Emerson 
cited to a prior ruling that expanded further, saying: “[i]f a woman by words or 
acts or by any device invites and solicits and submits to indiscriminate 
intercourse, she is a common prostitute.”179 
Importantly, many of the laws, like those in Emerson, that dictated those 
antiquated and blatantly sexist views have changed, as has enforcement of those 
laws.180 State courts in the &*(#s and &*)#s were operating in a world with a very 
different set of moral, legal, and ethical assumptions than state court judges are 
today.181 And even while mired in those antiquated attitudes, more often than 
not these courts still did not approve of police engaging in sex during sting 
operations, even while saying these actions were technically constitutional.182 
Because of the drastic changes in societal views on paid sex and police 
tactics, these state court decisions need not inform our views today about 
what constitutes Outrageous Government Conduct. Instead, more recent 
court decisions like Chon and Burkland should be foregrounded. I do not argue 
that we should pick and choose state court decisions based on whether or not 
they come out in favor of the Outrageous Government Conduct defense: 
rather, that we should follow the Supreme Court’s exact prescriptions about 
how to apply the Due Process Clause. 
In Rochin, Justice Frankfurter called the Due Process Clause “the least 
speci.c and most comprehensive protection of liberties.”183 Unlike other .xed 
constitutional protections, the Due Process Clause requires judges to make 
decisions that are based on “interests of society,” that are not “.nal and .xed,” 
and that are “bound to fall di+erently at di+erent times.”184 Essentially, the 
Due Process Clause allows for /exibility over time—and what’s more, it may 
actually require it.185 Chon and Burkland represent court decisions made in the 
 
178 Emerson, !$+ P.&d at &,+ (citing State v. Thuna, !# Wash. %*#, %#' (Wash. $#$')). 
179 Thuna, $'# P. at ""$. 
180 The law de(ning and criminalizing acting as a “common prostitute” has been repealed. 
WASH. REV. CODE § #.+#.'%' ($#+"). Washington’s new Prostitution laws instead criminalize only 
“engag[ing] or agree[ing] or o-er[ing] to engage in sexual conduct with another person in return for 
a fee.” WASH. REV. CODE § #A.**.'"' (&'&'). 
181 See infra notes $*!–**; see also Catherine I. Bolzendahl & Daniel J. Myers, Feminist Attitudes 
and Support for Gender Equality: Opinion Change in Women and Men, "%$'-"%%(, *" SOC. FORCES +!#, 
+!#-*# (&'',). 
182 See, e.g., State v. Tookes, %## P.&d #*", #*+ (Haw. $#*!) (noting that despite the 
constitutionality of police engaging in sex during a Prostitution sting operation, “we question 
whether the actions of . . . the police in this case comport with the ethical standards which law 
enforcement o)cials should be guided by”); Emerson, !$+ P.&d at &,# (“[O]ur opinion should not be 
misconstrued as a moral endorsement of the means employed to obtain the evidence used . . . .”). 
183 Rochin v. California, ",& U.S. $%!, $+' ($#!&). 
184 Id. at $+'-+$. 
185 See generally, Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On Originalism, 
Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, %' OKLA. L. REV. $, & (&''+) (arguing that the 
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twenty-.rst century, in light of society’s evolving normative standards in 
regard to due process. The drastic changes in attitudes towards 
criminalization and responses to the sex trade merit reexamining the question 
of Outrageous Government Conduct. 
These changing attitudes have already taken root in policy changes. In 
Washington State, for example, although prostitution remains a crime,186 the 
Seattle police department has stopped arresting people suspected of sex sales 
and instead drives them to counseling.187 Powerful organizations like 
Amnesty International have supported completely decriminalizing paid sex, 
as have high-pro.le political candidates and the current Vice President.188 
Recent polls show that a majority of Americans favor decriminalization, and 
that support is highest among voters between the ages of eighteen and forty-
four, across all political identi.cations, suggesting that “[a]ge may be an even 
stronger predictor of support for decriminalizing sex work than political 
party.”189 This data shows that attitudes about paid sex have changed 
signi.cantly since the &*(#s and &*)#s. The courts’ de.nition of due process 
can and must change along with it. Even without decriminalization, the mere 
fact that a majority of Americans do not support arrest or conviction for the 
 
Due Process Clause cannot be viewed with an originalist interpretation and must therefore be viewed as 
a delegation of authority to courts to define and apply “due process” as a concept). 
186 Prostitution is a misdemeanor under Washington law, which carries a potential penalty of 
ninety days in jail and a (ne of /$,'''. See WASH. REV. CODE § #A.&'.'$' (&'&') (“Any crime 
punishable by a (ne of not more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail for 
not more than ninety days, or by both such (ne and imprisonment is a misdemeanor.”); id. 
§ #A.**.'"' (“Prostitution is a misdemeanor.”). 
187 See David Kroman, Seattle’s Latest Prostitution Sting: Progressive or Misguided? CROSSCUT 
(Nov. $, &'$*), https://crosscut.com/&'$*/$$/seattles-latest-Prostitution-sting-progressive-or-
misguided [https://perma.cc/V,KN-+CKM] (citing this approach as consistent with Seattle’s 
broader goal of “stamp[ing] out prostitution without penalizing the sex workers in the trade”). 
188 See AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON STATE OBLIGATIONS TO 
RESPECT, PROTECT AND FULFIL THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF SEX WORKERS & (&'$%), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/POL"','%&&'$%ENGLISH.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/*ERU-FVPB] (“Amnesty International calls for the decriminalization of all 
aspects of adult consensual sex work due to the foreseeable barriers that criminalization creates to 
the realization of the human rights of sex workers.”); Jasmine Garsd, Should Sex Work Be 
Decriminalized? Some Activists Say It’s Time, NPR (Mar. &&, &'$#, &:," PM), 
https://www.npr.org/&'$#/'"/&&/+'!"!,$+#/should-sex-work-be-decriminalized-some-activists-say-
its-time [https://perma.cc/FG"+-MTRA] (explaining that many organizations are “advocating bills 
to decriminalize sex work in New York City and New York state”); Tessa Stuart, Kamala Harris 
Declares Her Support for Decriminalizing Sex Work, ROLLING STONE (Feb. &%, &'$#, ":", PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/kamala-harris-sex-workers-rights-+##'&$ 
[https://perma.cc/P,HE-UMP,] (describing then-Senator Kamala Harris’s support for the 
decriminalization of sex work between consenting adults). 
189 NINA LUO, DECRIMINALIZING SURVIVAL: POLICY PLATFORM AND POLLING ON THE 
DECRIMINALIZATION OF SEX WORK &&-&" (&'&'), http://(lesforprogress.org/memos/ 
decriminalizing-sex-work.pdf [https://perma.cc/&XYF-ETKV]. 
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crime of prostitution fatally undermines police justi.cations for elaborate 
sting operations to target paid sex. 
B. Entrapment Is an Inadequate Substitute for the Outrageous Government 
Conduct Defense 
The defense of subjective entrapment as it currently stands is no 
substitute for the Outrageous Government Conduct defense in paid-sex sting 
operations because, in the majority of jurisdictions, a .nding of 
predisposition defeats any entrapment claim.190 Therefore, when an 
individual is targeted by law enforcement, evidence of predisposition can 
render an entrapment defense impossible no matter the egregiousness of o"cer 
misconduct.191 Some have called Outrageous Government Conduct cases 
“extreme entrapment” because both involve police conduct that goes 
overboard.192 But entrapment’s predisposition element undermines one of the 
defense’s purported goals: deterring outrageous conduct.193 The entrapment 
defense seems, in part, based on the idea that inducing someone to commit a 
crime is itself wrong. But predisposition muddies this idea by focusing the 
defense on the actions and prior record of the criminal defendant, rather than 
the law enforcement o,cer.194 If Outrageous Government Conduct as a 
defense was, in fact, an outgrowth of entrapment, the same problem might 
occur. But unlike entrapment, Outrageous Government Conduct is a test 
based in the Bill of Rights, and a question of due process must focus on the 
behavior of government agents.195 Even in a case where a defendant was 
undoubtedly predisposed, the Constitution cannot allow courts to turn their 
 
190 See e.g., United States v. Russell, ,$$ U.S. ,&", ,"% ($#+") (“Respondent’s 
concession . . . that the jury (nding as to predisposition was supported by the evidence is, therefore, 
fatal to his claim of entrapment.”). 
191 For further discussion about the distinctions between entrapment and Outrageous 
Government Conduct, see Eve A. Zelinger, The Outrageous Government Conduct Defense: An 
Interpretive Argument for Its Application by SCOTUS, ,% HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. $!", $%'-%& (&'$*). 
192 Rachael Urbansky, Note, Seducing the Target: Sexual Intercourse as Outrageous Government 
Conduct, !' CASE W. RES. L. REV. +&#, +", (&'''). 
193 See T. Ward Frampton, Predisposition and Positivism: The Forgotten Foundations of the 
Entrapment Doctrine, $'" J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY $$$, $$" (&'$") (noting that under 
predisposition, “[f]actors like the nature or size of the inducement, the complexity of the 
government arti(ce, or the independent capacity of the defendant to commit the crime are largely 
irrelevant . . . rather, the controlling question is whether the defendant is a person otherwise 
innocent . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
194 See Andrew Carlon, Note, Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State, #" VA. L. REV. 
$'*$, $'** (&''+) (describing how the entrapment test allows the court to explore “the defendant’s 
character, prior bad acts, and other otherwise traditionally irrelevant and prejudicial evidence”). 
195 See Michael O. Zabriskie, If the Postman Always “Stings” Twice, Who Is the Next Target?—An 
Examination of the Entrapment Theory, $# J. CONTEMP. L. &$+, &&!-&+ ($##") (describing that the 
conduct of law enforcement agents can be evaluated under a due process analysis). 
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backs on egregious police misconduct. The Rochin court did not mention 
Antonio Rochin’s undeniably illegal actions, or the potential danger of the 
crime.196 Instead, it faced horri.c law enforcement overreach and said: this 
shall not stand.197 Subjective entrapment in its current form cannot do that, 
which makes it an inadequate substitute for an Outrageous Government 
Conduct defense in paid-sex sting operations. 
Objective-approach entrapment could theoretically solve this problem by 
presenting an entrapment defense without a predisposition requirement. But 
because entrapment has no basis in the Constitution, it cannot protect 
individuals in subjective-approach jurisdictions from outrageous government 
action without a due process defense. As a federal constitutional defense 
recognized by the Supreme Court, Outrageous Government Conduct would 
protect all defendants who are targeted by outrageous misconduct by 
government agents. Defendants who are not able to put forward an 
entrapment claim could still successfully argue their due process rights were 
violated by Outrageous Government Conduct.198 
C. The Cuervelo and Nolan–Cooper Tests Currently in E!ect Clearly Prohibit 
Sexual Contact by Law Enforcement for the Purposes  
of Inducing a Crime of Prostitution 
Some commentators have advocated for a bright-line rule that a government 
agent engaging in sex with the target of an investigation is Outrageous 
Government Conduct.199 However, courts across the country have rejected this 
view, finding that there are instances when a government agent or informant 
engages in sexual relations with a target that do not violate the target’s due 
process rights.200 Those cases focus primarily on a different kind of sexual 
inducement, best illustrated by the case of United States v. Cuervelo.201 
 
196 See generally Rochin v. California, ",& U.S. $%!, $+& ($#!&) (focusing discussion on law 
enforcement conduct rather than on the defendant’s conduct). 
197 See id. at $+& (“[W]e are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction 
was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about 
combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience.”). 
198 United States v. Cuervelo, #,# F.&d !!#, !%! (&d Cir. $##$). 
199 See Urbansky, supra note $#&, at +"& (calling for “a new rule that any sexual relationship 
between a government agent and the target of an investigation which advances to the point of sexual 
intercourse is a per se violation of the target’s due process rights”). 
200 See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, *$" F.&d $,%&, $,%% (#th Cir. $#*+) (“[T]he deceptive creation 
and/or exploitation of an intimate relationship does not exceed the boundary of permissible law 
enforcement tactics.”); United States v. Nolan-Cooper, $!! F."d &&$, &,! ("d Cir. $##*) (concluding that 
a one-time sexual intercourse between a government agent and the defendant was not a violation of due 
process); United States v. Miller, *#$ F.&d $&%!, $&%* (+th Cir. $#*#) (finding that a sexually intimate 
relationship between a government informant and the target of a drug investigation did not constitute 
truly Outrageous Government Conduct). 
201 For an in-depth discussion of the Cuervelo case and test, see supra Section II.C. 
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Under the Cuervelo test, sexual contact in a paid-sex sting operation 
clearly violates the Due Process Clause. In fact, any case where law 
enforcement engages in sexual relations—or induces a con.dential informant 
to engage in sexual relations—for the purpose of securing a prostitution 
conviction .ts squarely in the realm of illegal conduct under Cuervelo. 
The first requirement of Cuervelo is “that the government consciously set 
out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory arsenal or acquiesced in such 
conduct for its own purposes upon learning that such a relationship existed.”202 
When the government engages in sexual relations with an investigative target 
and the end goal is to secure a charge of prostitution, there is no doubt that the 
sex is being used as a weapon to achieve that goal. The only potential leeway 
here is Cuervelo’s language that government agents “acquiesced in such conduct 
for its own purposes upon learning that such a relationship existed”;203 in a 
hypothetical case involving a confidential informant, perhaps the government 
could claim not to know the encounter crossed into a sexual relationship. But 
under Nolan–Cooper, the Third Circuit adapts this test to include any conduct 
the government knew or should have known was occurring.204 This adaptation 
closes the loophole somewhat, essentially requiring that the police brief 
confidential informants that they are not permitted to engage in sexual conduct 
and take steps to ensure that this will not occur. And in cases like Chon, where 
police instructed the informant to “go ahead and have sex,” there is no doubt 
that the first prong is met.205 
The second prong, that the government agent initiated a sexual 
relationship, or allowed it to continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends, 
is also clearly met.206 When government agents engage in a sexual 
relationship to obtain a conviction, they achieve the government ends of law 
enforcement and securing convictions for illegal acts. When they permit a 
con.dential informant to do so, the same conclusion proceeds. 
The .nal prong of Cuervelo is that the sexual relationship took place 
during or close to the period covered by the indictment and was entwined 
with the events charged therein.207 This is perhaps the clearest of all. When 
the indictment itself charges sexual conduct, the sexual conduct charged is 
without a doubt covered by the indictment. 
Under the Cuervelo and Nolan–Cooper tests, the government action in Chon 
is outrageous. And although both the trial and appellate courts cited some of the 
more egregious, horrifying facts from the case—for example, that the police 
 
202 Cuervelo, #,# F.&d at !%+. 
203 Id. 
204 Nolan-Cooper, $!! F."d at &"". 
205 Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon, #*" A.&d +*,, +#' (Pa. Super. Ct. &''#). 
206 Cuervelo, #,# F.&d at !%+. 
207 Id. 
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officers laughed and joked with the informant about the sex, and that the 
informant claimed to be “offended” by the acts and then happily went through 
with them anyway208—the test clearly prohibits any case of police or undercover 
informants engaging in sexual contact for the purpose of charging prostitution. 
D. The Supreme Court Should Either Issue a Bright-Line Rule that This Conduct 
Is Outrageous or Adopt the Cuervelo/Nolan–Cooper  
Limits that Ensure it Will Be 
As it stands now, numerous jurisdictions have no bar on police engaging 
in sexual acts or inducing informants to do so for the purpose of obtaining 
prostitution charges. If entrapment is unavailable because of predisposition, 
and the jurisdiction either does not recognize an Outrageous Government 
Conduct claim or has a prohibitively high bar to doing so, vulnerable people 
who will be targeted by these actions are placed at risk of conviction and due 
process violations based on egregious law enforcement tactics. 
Courts have options to make clear that this conduct is unacceptable and 
protect the public from convictions based on outrageous government 
conduct. First, they can issue a bright-line rule: when a government agent or 
informant has sexual contact for the purposes of securing a prostitution or 
solicitation conviction, that is the outrageous government action 
contemplated by Hampton and Sherman. Second, they can adopt the test laid 
out in Cuervelo and Nolan-Cooper to de.ne the scope of permissible sexual 
conduct between government agents and investigative targets. Finally, they 
can put forth any new de.nition of Outrageous Government Conduct that 
ensures law enforcement is prohibited from engaging in paid sex to secure a 
prostitution or prostitution-related conviction. 
III. WITHOUT THE DEFENSE, WHAT ARE OUR OPTIONS? 
Without Supreme Court guidance, advocates in states can push for local 
legislation that will criminalize this action. For example, in jurisdictions that 
currently operate without an Outrageous Government Conduct defense, or 
where it is prohibitively di,cult to prove, local lawmakers and organizers 
have worked to supplement or replace it.209 
One option is criminalizing speci.c law enforcement activity, so that even 
if criminal defendants are unable to invoke the Outrageous Government 
Conduct defense, police can be prosecuted. It is worth noting that these 
solutions can work in tandem: even in a jurisdiction where the Outrageous 
Government Conduct defense is accessible, it could still be valuable to have 
 
208 Chon, #*" A.&d at +#'. 
209 See infra notes &$'–&$&. 
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an option to prosecute law enforcement. However, even with prosecution of 
police o,cers, targets of investigation could potentially still be prosecuted 
and face jail time, even if the o,cer goes on to be charged as well. 
In Pennsylvania, for example, there is currently no criminal ban on law 
enforcement o,cers having sexual contact with a person in their custody, and 
an o,cer accused of sexual assault can claim consent as a full legal defense.210 
Legislation has been introduced in both Pennsylvania legislative houses to 
criminalize all sexual contact between an o,cer and an individual in 
custody.211 The legislation, entitled “No Consent in Custody,” was introduced 
in the Pennsylvania Senate by Senator Katie Muth, who argued that because 
of the power imbalance between an o,cer and the person in their custody, 
“there cannot be consent when you are in the custody of law enforcement.”212 
Notably, however, the proposed legislation and its successful counterparts 
in other states would not protect a target of a paid-sex sting operation, who 
would not be in the custody of police when the sexual act occurred. Shea 
Rhodes, a Pennsylvania attorney, and advocate for victims of commercial 
sexual exploitation, advocates instead for a more comprehensive statute 
entitled “sexual assault by peace o,cer” that would apply not only to people 
in custody, but to anyone being investigated by the peace o,cer at the time.213 
Under a statute of this kind, the state would be able to prosecute an o,cer 
who engaged in sexual acts with a person who was the target of a prostitution 
investigation. However, it is unclear whether the prosecution power would 
extend to a con.dential informant as an agent of the state. 
 
210 $* PA. CONS. STAT. § "$&,.$ ($##!) (de(ning sexual assault as “engag[ing] in sexual 
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant without the complainant’s consent”); Press 
Release, Katie Muth, Pa. State Senator, Muth, Rabb, Krasner, and Advocates Call for Swift Passage of 
No Consent in Custody (Nov. $#, &'$#), https://www.senatormuth.com/muth-rabb-krasner-and-
advocates-call-for-swift-passage-of-no-consent-in-custody [https://perma.cc/LV"C-R&*R]. 
211 Currently, Pennsylvania law criminalizes “institutional rape,” which is de(ned as sexual 
contact between a corrections o)cer or mental health professional and an inmate, detainee, patient, 
or resident. $* PA. CONS. STAT. § "$&,.&. The introduced bills would amend this provision to add 
“peace o)cers” to the list of potential perpetrators of institutional rape. See &'$# Pa. Laws $$%,. 
212 Katie Muth (Senator Katie Muth), Sen. Muth Calls for Passage of No Consent in Custody 
Legislation, FACEBOOK (Nov. $#, &'$#), https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v0!!$"#,"!&"&""&" 
[https://perma.cc/LW#G-CX%T]. The bill is modeled in part o- of New York legislation that passed 
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a defense to sexual assault charges, when they allegedly required an $*-year-old to engage in sexual 
acts in order to be released. Sponsor Memo, SB S++'*, &'$+-$* Leg. Session (NY &'$*), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/&'$+/s++'* [https://perma.cc/WS!M-BXH,]. 
213 Telephone Interview with Shea Rhodes, Esq., Director and Co-Founder of the Villanova 
Law Institute to Address Commercial Sexual Exploitation (Jan. "', &'&'). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court put an important check on outrageous 
government action in Commonwealth v. Sun Cha Chon.214 But the actions taken 
by police in cases like it continue.215 Particularly when o,cers investigate 
crimes like prostitution, and disproportionately target low-income, nonwhite, 
and female, trans, and nonbinary people, government resources must not be 
utilized to engage in sexual contact to secure convictions. Not only is it 
inappropriate and unnecessary for convictions, continuous reports of police 
sexual violence prove that this power cannot and must not be trusted to law 
enforcement. The Due Process Clause enables us to curb the tremendous 
power at the government’s disposal when it “shocks the conscience,”216 and 
protect vulnerable citizens from outrageous abuse at the hands of law 
enforcement. 
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